Abuse Of Dominance Overview

Principles

Definition

Abuse of dominance is a core concept within competition and antitrust law that investigates the prohibited conduct of entities holding a dominant position in a relevant market. It scrutinizes specific practices lacking objective justification that distort competition, thereby examining their market effects and the legal frameworks designed to prevent such distortions and protect consumer welfare. Research in this field analyzes the criteria for establishing dominance, the diverse forms of abusive conduct (e.g., exclusionary or exploitative practices), their economic impact, and the effectiveness of regulatory interventions.

Ontological type

Types of Abusive Conduct

Market Power Assessment

Legal Frameworks

Key developments

Key Figures

Non-Price Abuse Paradigm era

Luigi Zingales [1] is a central figure in the Non-Price Abuse Paradigm (2000–2008) era, with affiliations including Harvard University [3] and the University of Pennsylvania [4]. His key contribution in this era, the paper Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison [7], analyzed how controlling interests confer private gains that can sustain non-price power, shaping governance and enforcement debates. Yongmin Chen [2] is another pivotal scholar in this era, with affiliations including Northwestern University [5] and the University of Colorado Boulder [6]. Chen's major contribution in this era is the work On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects [8], which examined how vertical integration affects competition and non-price constraints, informing analysis of dominance without relying on price effects.

Platform Power and Foreclosure era

Marshall Van Alstyne [1], associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology [3] and Boston University [4] during this era, stands as a central figure. His key contribution in this era is the Platform envelopment concept, articulated in the 2011 paper Platform envelopment [7], which analyzes how platform firms extend control across adjacent markets to foreclose competition. Geoffrey Parker [2], associated with Tulane University [5] and Dartmouth College [6] during this period, also emerges as a central voice in the platform-power literature. Parker's central contribution in this era is the co‑authored Platform envelopment [7], which emphasizes cross‑market linkages and strategic architecture enabling platform governance and foreclosure, shaping policy discussions.

Platform Power Governance era

Andrei Hagiu [1] is a scholar at Harvard University [3] and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology [4] in the Platform Power Governance era (2016-2022). In Hagiu's analysis [1] in the paper Should platforms be allowed to sell on their own marketplaces [6], he examines how platforms' own marketplace sales can shape multi-sided markets and gatekeeping, underscoring why governance and competition policy mattered in this era. Julian Wright [2] is affiliated with the National University of Singapore [5] during this era. Wright [2] co-authored the same paper [6], whose insights into platform gatekeeping and cross-side access illustrate why regulatory and governance reforms were pivotal for ecosystem power governance in this period.